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to be presented at the Central Division APA on February 19, 2010
draft of February 8, 2010

I am grateful to Professor Szubka for the stimulus of his paper1 and the opportunity it presents
to think about the relationship between Richard Rorty’s later “pragmatic” philosophy and the so-called
“analytic” tradition he came to repudiate. I am in agreement with Professor Szubka’s central thesis,
namely, that there is a “partial” continuity between the Rorty of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature
and his later writing, and the Rorty of the 1960s: Rorty was not the diehard “analytic” philosopher who
then, suddenly and in`explicably, gave up on the whole business. His metaphilosophical work in that
decade, especially as exemplified in The Linguistic Turn, signaled quite clearly his misgivings about the
philosophical project typically associated with the analytic tradition (which at that time, at least, was not
yet moribund). I will offer some additional support for Professor Szubka’s thesis drawn from Neil
Gross’s recent biography of Rorty, which illuminates both Rorty’s education at Chicago and Yale in the
1940s and 1950s and the context in which he became a kind of “analytic” philosopher at Princeton in
the 1960s.2 I shall then suggest that the more striking question about Rorty is not why he gave up on
“analytic” philosophy, but why he gave up on philosophy, that is, on a two-thousand year tradition
stretching back to antiquity, one which nothing in his pre-Princeton education and experience would
have led us to expect. Rorty’s “radical break” was not with ‘analytic’ philosophy—a point often
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obscured in popular presentations of his work--but with philosophy itself. And it is that that demands
some explanation.
As Neil Gross demonstrates, the two formative influences in Rorty’s philosophical education
were the historical orientation of the University of Chicago (especially under the tutelage of Richard
McKeon), where he was an undergraduate, and the “metaphysical” and even “theological” orientation
of the Yale University department, where he was a graduate student. Indeed, speculative
metaphysics—of the kind associated with Whitehead at Harvard earlier in the 20th-century, Hartshorne
at Chicago, and Blandshard and Weiss at Yale--was central to Yale’s conception of its mission in the
1950s. In opposition to ordinary language philosophy and logical positivism, the leaders of the Yale
Department wanted it to “stand for speculative philosophy and the sacred” (Gross, 130 *quoting
Kuklick]). When Rorty applied to Yale, he described his interests thus:
I should like to acquire a better grasp of the alternatives on the nature and content of logic, and,
most of all, to learn as much as I can about the specific differences and similarities between the
methods and results of the predecessors and exponents of existentialism and those of the type
of philosophy which, I think, reaches its culmination in Whitehead and his
successors…Eventually…I should like to study in Europe and gain a more thorough and
immediate acquaintance with recent European developments in philosophy. (Gross, 137)
This was plainly not a ‘statement of interests’ by a young logical positivist. Indeed, the young man who
wrote a 600-page doctoral dissertation on the concept of “potentiality” in Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza,
and Leibniz, concluding the thesis with a critique of ‘logical empiricism’ (Gross, 142-143), did not seem a
likely recruit to the ‘analytic’ revolution sweeping American philosophy. In the late 1950s and early
1960s, as Neil Gross documents, Rorty was very much concerned with the pragmatism of Pierce, as well
as the critiques of philosophy in Wittgenstein and Sellars (157 ff.)--even admitting, correctly, that most
of what he published “was parasitic on [the] ideas” of Sellars (quoted in Gross, 160). Yet, as Gross notes,
2
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“it would have been eminently clear to Rorty that in order to be tenurable [at Princeton in the 1960s],
he would have to make a significant contribution to analytic thought” (177). One line of research was
metaphilosophical, reflected in The Linguistic Turn, on which Professor Szubka focuses. The other line of
research, on which Professor Szubka does not comment, was a series of papers in philosophy of mind,
defending, among other doctrines, eliminative materialism! It is harder to square this work with Rorty’s
later views, though perhaps this was pure professionalism on his part: after about 1970, he never really
returned to these issues.
As Professor Szubka observes, the later Rorty abandons the idea that philosophy should “find*+
solutions to a certain set of problems and seek*+ consensus” in favor of the idea of philosophy as
“continuing iconoclastic conversation and proposing wide-ranging narratives having transformative
effects on their readers” (5). This idea of “philosophy” would have been as shocking to W.V.O. Quine
and David K. Lewis as to Brand Blanshard and Alfred North Whitehead. As Jaegwon Kim correctly
pointed out in an illuminating 1980 essay,3 the argument of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature is
directed against three very general doctrines, none of which are peculiar to (or even distinctive of)
English-speaking philosophy in the 20th-century. Kim identified them as:

(1) The Platonic doctrine concerning truth and knowledge, according to which truth is
correspondence with nature, and knowledge is a matter of possessing accurate
representations.
(2) The Cartesian doctrine of the mind as the private inner stage, "the Inner Mirror," in
which cognitive action takes place. The Platonic doctrine of knowledge as representation
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was transformed into the idea of knowledge as inner representation of outer reality. The
Cartesian contribution was to mentalize the Platonic doctrine.
(3) The conception of Philosophy according to which it is the business of philosophy to
investigate the "foundations" of the sciences, the arts, culture and morality, and
adjudicate the cognitive claims of these areas. Philosophy, as epistemology, must set
universal standards of rationality and objectivity for all actual and possible claims of
knowledge.
As Kim notes, there are many philosophers who would be identified as "analytic" who reject all
of these views. Perhaps more importantly, there are plenty of philosophers whom no one would
think "analytic" who embrace one or more of these doctrines. Kant, Hegel, and Husserl, for
example, are obviously more invested in the conception of philosophy as foundational to the rest
of culture than, say, Quine or Jerry Fodor. Rorty's attack on the three doctrines identified by
Kim, then, was not an attack on the now defunct "analytic" philosophy of the mid-20th-century;
it was an attack on the central concerns of philosophy going back to antiquity.

To my mind, the most puzzling fact about Rorty’s later work is that he repudiated the whole of
philosophy, not just a particular movement in Anglophone philosophy of the post-War era. Many
philosophers took seriously the two argumentative linchpins of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature-Quine’s critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction and Sellars’s critique of the “Myth of the Given” -but none of those so influenced—I am thinking, inter alia, of Jerry Fodor, Gilbert Harman, Stephen Stich,
Hilary Kornblith, Alvin Goldman, Paul Churchland, Robert Cummins, among many others--thought that
the right response was to scrap the traditional philosophical ambition of figuring out what was true and
knowable, in favor of some ill-defined rhetorical excitation and uplift. Instead, most philosophers
4

thought the upshot of the destruction of “analytic” philosophy by Quine and Sellars was that
philosophical questions had to be suitably naturalized, that philosophy’s only function was to offer some
abstract reflection upon and clarification of the discoveries of the sciences. If Harvard had taken Quine
seriously, they would have closed the Department of Philosophy, and sent its remaining ‘useful’
members to help their muddle-headed colleagues in the natural and social sciences think more clearly
about what they were doing. If Princeton had taken Rorty seriously, they would have simply turned
philosophy and its history over to the experts in narratives and rhetoric in literature departments.
Rorty, in one of his last articles, agreed with me that one could divide much of the current
Anglophone philosophical scene into “naturalists” and “quietists,” Rorty’s own sympathies lying, of
course, with those who thought we should remain “quiet” about traditional philosophical problems
rather than naturalize them.4 We should do so, said Rorty, because such questions have no relevance to
what he called “cultural politics.”5 One might think of this as an elite bourgeois academic’s version of
Marx’s 2nd Thesis on Feuerbach: “the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a
purely scholastic question.” Marx, of course, wanted to repudiate the metaphysics and epistemology of
German Idealism, since such inquiries were irrelevant to revolutionary practice. Rorty, by contrast,
wants to make philosophy the handmaiden to “cultural politics,” which, on the evidence of his own
rather vapid liberal political writings, is unlikely to make the capitalist class tremble.
Nietzsche famously remarked that all great philosophies are a kind of “involuntary and
unconscious memoir” (Beyond Good and Evil). So what “memoir” has Richard Rorty given us in the
form of his philosophical corpus, which goes from a dissertation on the concept of potentiality to a

4

Richard Rorty, “Naturalism and Quietism,” in his Philosophy as Cultural Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007). He here responds to my “Introduction” to The Future for Philosophy, ed. B. Leiter (Oxford:
Clarendon Pres, 2004).
5

“Naturalism and Quietism,” p. __.

5

complete repudiation of the entire philosophical tradition? We can only speculate, but I will conclude
with two suggestive anecdotes.
Rorty’s first wife, the philosopher Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, described the young Richard Rorty as
“dedicated to the greater glory of God through philosophy” (Gross, 198) and suggested to his
biographer, Neil Gross, that the psychoanalysis he underwent during much of the 1960s and into the
early 1970s (Gross, 216 n. 98) contributed significantly to the work that became Philosophy and the
Mirror of Nature.
The second anecdote comes from my own experience. I was fortunate as a college student to
have Rorty as a teacher, in a course covering Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and William James!
The theme of the course was clear in retrospect: reactions to Kant either went the bad metaphysical
route (Fichte and Hegel) or the good pragmatist route (Marx, Nietzsche, and James). In retrospect, the
narrative was implausible, but there is no doubt that Rorty was a gifted lecturer and I remain grateful for
the experience. But what is relevant here is a comment Rorty made one day during a discussion
section: “it’s too bad,” he said, “that there turned out to be no absolute to correspond to,” which was
followed by one of his trademark shrugs.
There is no God and there is no ‘absolute’—Quine and Nietzsche, among many others, would
have agreed with those claims. Why did Rorty respond to those realizations his way, rather than
Quine’s or Nietzsche’s? The real answer may, alas, rest with his psychoanalyst.
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